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Abstract— In a world where communication and information sharing are at the heart of our business, the terminology needs 
are most pressing. It has become imperative to identify the terms used and defined in a consensual and coherent way while 
preserving linguistic diversity.  To streamline and strengthen the process of acquisition, representation and exploitation of 
scenarii of train accidents, it is necessary to harmonize and standardize the terminology used by players in the security field. 
The research aims to significantly improve analytical activities and operations of the various safety studies, by tracking the error 
in system, hardware, software and human. This paper presents the contribution of ontology to modeling scenarii for rail 
accidents through a knowledge model based on a generic ontology and domain ontology. After a detailed presentation of the 
state of the art material, this article presents the first results of the developed model. 
Index Terms— Human safety , Knowledge acquisition ,Ontology design, Transportation. 
——————————      —————————— 
1. Introduction
egative impact, the terrible cost of accidents, the 
occurrence of future disasters despite the ad-
vances in technology are the basis for the establishment of 
a process of feedback (Rex) as an essential means to pro-
mote the necessary improvement in security. The concept 
of "feedback" on transportation security is defined differ-
ently by authors and fields.  
The part common to all definitions is the interest of 
learning from an experience to avoid reproduction. The 
Rex is a dynamic process of collection, storage, analysis 
and exploitation of data relating to breach security situa-
tions (accident or incident). It consists in an analytical 
study of different causal factors involved in the genesis of 
incidents or accidents. Rex allows a better understanding 
of the mechanisms leading to events of insecurity. Its 
purpose is to benefit from the lessons of past experience 
to improve the level of security by implementing preven-
tive measures and correctives to prevent accidents and 
incidents [1].  
The methods of acquiring knowledge, applied to the 
field of security analysis, have shown their interests to 
extract and formalize the historical knowledge of security 
analysis (mainly accident scenarii) and its limits in terms 
of extraction of gait analysis and expert evaluation of 
safety, especially based on intuition and imagination. 
Generally, current methods of acquiring knowledge have 
been developed for well-structured problems. They do 
not address the specifics of the multi-expertise and coex-
istence of diverse knowledge and do not allow access to 
the subjective and intuitive knowledge related to a highly 
scalable and field unbounded as is that of security and 
certification of rail transport systems. Indeed, the acquisi-
tion of knowledge has encountered the difficulty of ex-
tracting expertise raised at each stage of the process of 
analysis and safety assessment. This difficulty stems from 
the complexity of the expertise that naturally encourages 
the experts to give their expertise through significant 
examples or scenarii of accidents experienced on auto-
mated transit systems already certified. 
2. System ACASYA 
2.1 Presentation 
In contrast to diagnostic support systems, "ACASYA" 
can be seen as a tool for the prevention of accidents at the 
stage of system design. The objective of this tool is, firstly 
to assess the completeness and consistency of accident 
scenarii proposed by manufacturers and secondly to con-
tribute to the generation of new scenarii that could help 
experts certification. Specifically, the tool "ACASYA" can 
help experts of INRETS, even the builder and the client, 
particularly in the assessment phase of the completeness 
of functional assays Security (AFS). The work performed 
under the two theories [2] , [3] LAMIH at the University 
of Valenciennes and pursued INRETS ESTAS-enabled: 
1. To establish a base that includes 70 accident 
scenarii; 
2. Develop a formalism scenarii (static and dy-
namic description); 
3. To develop a model of feasibility ACASYA 
structured around three modules Fig. 1 : 
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- CLASCA is a model of inductive learning system 
for classification of scenarii; 
-  EVALSCA is a model of expert system to aid scenar-
io assessment. This model, developed around the learn-
ing system of rules CHARADE J.-G. Ganascia (LIP6) 
aims to suggest to experts possible failures not consid-
ered in the safety analysis; 
- GENESCA is a model system for assisting the gener-
ation of scenarii. This feasibility model does not system-
atically generate new scenarii relevant and usable, but 
only embryos of scenarii that stimulate the imagination 
of experts in the formulation of scenarii of accidents. 
 
 
2.2. Model representation of accident scenarii 
2.2.1. Accident scenario 
An accident scenario describes a combination of cir-
cumstances that can lead to undesirable and even dan-
gerous situations. It is characterized by a context and a set 
of events and parameters. Phase Micro-extraction of 
knowledge has led to the shaping of a particular model 
based on the identification of eight parameters describing 
an accident scenario [2] , [4]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Static description of an accident scenarii 
The static description lists the main parameters of an 
accident scenario in a "fact sheet" prepared as a table of 
data (Attributes / Values). The attributes correspond to 
the eight parameters and each attribute is associated to a 
list of possible values.  
This information has subsequently been used as a 
basic form for the acquisition scenarii, it is exhaustive and 
can approach the study of any type of automated trans-
portation system (VAL MAGGALY POMA). In summary, 
the static description of a scenario has led to the definition 
of a first language for describing examples of scenarii. 
This is a classical representation by attribute-value pairs. 
This language of expression is close to the language of the 
expert certifier and has the advantage of being compatible 
with the structure of historical data security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Organisation functional model of the system ACASYA [2]. 
 
Fig. 2. Characteristic parameters of an accident scenario 
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2.2.3. Dynamic description of an accident scenario 
The dynamic description is based on the use of two 
modes of representation of a scenario: Petri and Table 
Sequencing of marking. 
The Petri net tool, formal specification and description 
of the systems have been used to model the behavior of 
the equipment or the transport system challenged by the 
script. To accommodate the different elements of the sce-
nario modeled, Petri dissociates three aspects: 
 The first aspect describes the system's external envi-
ronment (for example, the passage of a train from one 
station to another). 
The second aspect takes into account the internal envi-
ronment, i.e. automatic as autopilots, alarms… 
The third describes the interface between these two 
types of environment that ensures the exchange of infor-
mation. 
Modeling a scenario of an accident by a Petri then 
used simulation to examine all outstanding situations 
deemed dangerous or undesirable in terms of security. In 
practice, the Petri prepared for a scenario allows a more 
comprehensive study of various possible situations of 
insecurity. Each of these situations is described as a table 
called "sequencing of the CE marking. 
Table Sequencing of Marking: this chronology of 
events preceding the partial or total alteration of the secu-
rity. [2], [3] It is characterized by three basic concepts: 
- An initial state (initial marking) 
- A chronology of situations, 
- A critical situation (that is somehow a pre-
accident because it announces the inevitable ac-
cident). 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Fact sheet parameters of an accidents scenarii 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Modeling the scenarii by R. Petri [2] ,[3]. 
CHARACTERISTICS PARAMETERS  
OF AN ACC IDENT SCENARIO  
 List of 
attributes  
List of possible values 
Chosen 
Va lues(
X) 
Key 
Concepts
(*)  
1 geographic
al Pri nciple  
Fixed Canton   
moving  Canton  x * 
2 Risks 
Collision x * 
Derailment    
Poorly controlled 
Emergency Evacuation 
  
Drop in the vehicle   
Fall on the way   
Entrainement de 
l’individu  
  
Evacuation   
Hour of  closing the doors   
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Functions 
in 
connection 
with the 
risk  
Management of automatic 
driving  
x * 
Localisation des trains   
Control Input / Output    
Tracking trains    
Travel Direction 
Man agement 
x * 
Speed setpoint   
Management of trains 
Stops 
  
Security Pier Lane   
Authorization CI / HT    
Redundancy switching   
Initialization    
Manual Driving    
Alarm Management    
Evacuation   
Docking   
Routes Protection x * 
Traction / Braking    
4 
Geographic
al areas 
specified in 
scenario 
Terminus  x * 
Session   
Way    
Injection zone of oar x * 
Segment limit    
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Actors 
involved in 
scenario 
Number of trains  2 * 
Operator at CCPs   
Mobile operator    
PA with redundancy    
PA without redundancy  x * 
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Incidental  
Functions 
Route management x * 
Traffic regulation    
Instructions (consistency, 
vigilance) 
  
Communication 
(tran smission) 
  
7 
outlined  
Outages 
caused by 
the 
scenario 
OO26 
Element and 
target in 
opposite 
direction 
x * 
    
8 
Interim 
solutions 
IS    
Optimal 
solutions 
OS15 
Compare the 
meaning of the 
element target  
meaning 
x  
 
ENVIRONNEMENT 
EXTERNE INTERFACE
(AUTOMATISME)PA A PA B
R2
SA
FDT
SD
AI2
AI1
PR8
PAA PAB
I1 
PAA
I1 
PAB
I2 
PAA
I2 
PAB
AL
1
2
3
FDT
FDT
PA A
I1 PA A
PA B
I1 PA B
PA A
I2 PA A
PA B
I2 PA B
11
12
13
14
FDT
SD
AL
15
22 23 21
SDPR7
I2 PAB I2 PAA
1918
SD
ENVIRONNEMENT 
INTERNE
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3. Limits of works  
The study ACASYA raised three main limitations:  
 
- Limits on the model representation of accident sce-
narii: a sheet of 8 parameters: a textual description is 
not sufficient to formalize an accident scenario, we 
lose the richness and semantic aspects of knowledge. 
All descriptions (static / dynamic / text / graphics 
and) were not all used by ACASYA. Indeed, classifi-
cation, evaluation and generation of accident scenar-
ii have not used these various forms of representa-
tion jointly. It would be beneficial to make the most 
of the 4 forms of additional representations for the 
concept of accident scenario.  
- Not taking into account human factors although 
human error is responsible for 65% of accidents in 
railway transport [6]-[8].  
- Limits on exploitation knowledge archived. Indeed 
the evaluation scenarii in ACASYA relied solely on a 
particular attribute of the description: that of static 
failures summarized. Although this attribute is im-
portant, it would be better to extend further the as-
sessment base. In addition, the scenario generation 
has neglected the dynamic description of a scenario 
(the Petri network that illustrates the dynamics of 
sequencing an accident in space and time).  
Our work in this paper aims to provide a partial an-
swer to the first limitation mentioned. Indeed, despite the 
interest representation model accident scenarii adopted in 
ACASYA, it seems necessary to standardize and harmo-
nize the representation formalism and the terminology 
used by the players area. This terminology is suffering 
from the same view of the incompleteness and incon-
sistency of the model representations used, and it could 
be improved. In this context, ontology is well- suited to 
understand and improve significantly the representation 
formalism.  
In addition, the formalism adopted to represent these 
accident scenarii is limited to a purely technical aspect. 
However, an accident can be generated only through a 
Human/ Machine poor cooperation and / or environ-
ment, therefore, it seems obvious to be involved in model-
ing the human component scenarii.  
Before presenting the first results of the representation 
model developed, we will first present ontologies. The 
following paragraph is devoted to the overall presenta-
tion of ontologies 
 
4. Ontology  
4.1. Presentation 
Generally, an ontology is "the specification of a con-
ceptualization of a knowledge domain" .This definition is 
based on two dimensions: An ontology is the conceptual-
ization of a domain, i.e. tell a choice about how to de-
scribe a domain. It is also the specification of this concep-
tualization, that is to say its formal description. According 
to Natalya F. Noy and Deborah L. McGuinness [9] An 
ontology defines a common vocabulary for researchers 
who need to share information in a domain. It includes 
machine-readable definitions of basic concepts in this area 
and their relationships 
Ontology has gotten a pivotal place in many areas: Ar-
tificial Intelligence in Semantic Web, software engineering 
to biomedical informatics, and now, information architec-
ture is considered a form of knowledge representation. 
[10] Given the interest they represent, ontologies have 
been the subject of standardization. We can cite for exam-
ple the ISO 21127 standard (ISO 21127, August 2002) enti-
tled "Ontology needed to describe data concerning cul-
tural heritage." This standard was published in 2006 fol-
lowing the definition of intangible cultural heritage con-
ducted by the UNESCO. It describes in particular the 
metadata necessary for structuring ontology. 
Ontology is generally used for reasoning about objects 
in the relevant field modeled after a certain body of 
knowledge within the field. So, ontology is itself a data 
model representing a set of concepts in a domain, and the 
relationship between these concepts [10]. 
 
4.2.  Types of ontology 
Depending on their use, there are five categories of 
ontology [11] in this case: generic, domain, application, 
and representation of method: 
- Generic Ontology: describes general concepts, inde-
pendent of a field or a particular problem. Examples of 
concepts of time, space and event. 
- Domain Ontology: specifies a point of view on a par-
ticular area using vocabulary related to a domain of ge-
neric knowledge. The concepts of an ontology is often 
defined as a specialization of the concepts of generic on-
tology. A domain ontology consists of a description of the 
extension of the vocabulary domain, a typology and hier-
archy or a lattice of classes. 
- Application Ontology: Describes the structure of 
knowledge necessary to achieve a particular task [11]. It 
enables domain experts to use the same language as the 
application. 
- Representation Ontology: defines a set of primitive 
concept representations of domain ontology and generic 
ontology. 
- Method Ontology: describes the process of reasoning 
independently of a domain and a given implementation. 
It specifies the entities that fall under the resolution of a 
problem and provides definitions of concepts and rela-
tions used to specify a process of reasoning when per-
forming a particular task. 
 
5. Proposed approach 
5.1. Conceptual Model 
Very schematically, A formalization makes optimal 
ontology reuse, although reusability is confronted with 
usability. In other words, the more reusable an ontology 
is the more it loses in accuracy and therefore moving 
away from the application scenario and loses its useful-
ness. And an ontology is more specialized, the more it is 
close to the concerns of an application [12]. 
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The ontology in our context, uses two levels of ab-
straction of knowledge that we can qualify by knowledge 
of surface and deep knowledge. The knowledge of sur-
face are generally defined by what we call a generic on-
tology and the insights are defined by the domain ontolo-
gy. 
- A generic ontology: An ontology contains generic 
concepts such as Security: Background, Components 
dangerous, dangerous events, Causes of the accident, etc. 
- A domain ontology: This ontology describes the field 
of rail transportation safety, related to the specific system, 
the human operator and the environment. Most of these 
concepts are specializations of other concepts of the ge-
neric ontology. 
To represent the conceptual model, a choice was on 
the mind maps (mind maps) for their effectiveness in 
representing and visualizing hierarchies of concepts. 
They are also quite common and easy to handle (the pub-
lisher FreeMind 1 was used). However, as mind maps are 
not intended for the conceptualization of ontology, we 
have proposed some principles that operate the various 
elements of the publisher FreeMind (node, icon, com-
ment, etc..) To model the elements of ontology (concept, 
property, authority, etc..) needed in the conceptualization 
(Fig. 4,5,6) [13]: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An instance of a concept is represented by a node with 
an icon 1. 
 
 
 
5.2. Construction of the ontology 
 
Knowledge engineering involved in making a ma-
chine-readable ontologies. It is responsible for "modeling 
ontological" is to define the primitives of representation 
and meaning that will be used for the formal modeling of 
knowledge, a preliminary to formal modeling, that is to 
say, representation in formal language domain 
knowledge [14].  
 
Although there are several construction methods of the 
ontology, we adopted the method of Stanford University, 
implemented with the publisher protected. We conducted 
our choice on the basis of two arguments described be-
low: 
 
 
Fig. 4. The main classes of the generic ontology 
 
Fig. 6. Extract a few instances of concepts (Class: Event feared) 
 
Fig. 5. The extracted hierarchy of classes in the developed ontology   
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1. The method of Stanford University is detailed 
and promotes ease of development of ontolo-
gies for both professionals and for beginners;  
 
2. The ontology editor protege, is the most used. 
His popularity forced the editors of other on-
tologies (OntoStudio) to develop several gins 
that will do their ontologies. Protection is 
more flexible and better con-aunt by her 
community because it is an open source soft-
ware (unlike Ontostudio example that re-
quires a license); 
 
Fig. 7. Shows the different classes of the developed ontol-
ogy with the tool OwlVIZ integrated into the editor “the 
protégé” ; 
 
5.3. Extracting knowledge from the ontology 
 
We will in this pragraphe presented the first results of 
development of a model for querying the ontology devel-
oped. 
 
The developed model is based on an WEB approach. 
Indeed, a team of German scholars has recently devel-
oped a tool to use XML files: where one file extensions 
obtained after the construction of an ontology is an RDF / 
XML file (actually a file XML). We chose this tool for the 
operation of our ontology. The tool eXist-DB is an open 
source management database built using XML technolo-
gy. It allows to use the RDF file by exploiting the XQuery 
query language that supports. XQuery is a query lan-
guage for XML files with syntax very similar to the SQL 
language. 
Fig. 8. presents the functional architecture of the mod-
el developed that focuses on three main tasks: the acquisi-
tion, archiving and consultation for accidents; 
 
Fig. 9. presents the steps of acquiring a case. This is the 
first module of the system, which accesses the user expert 
once identified. The expert user can access the main clas-
ses, subclasses, including to instances extracted from the 
ontology. The expert user can select one or more instances 
possible (leaves) for each subclass. 
This model allows to automatically associate an XML 
file for each case (accident scenario) acquired. 
 
Fig. 7. Diagram of different classes of the ontology with Owl VIZ 
 
Fig. 8. Functional Architecture of the developed model 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The treatment of an accident scenario requires passage 
through several major phases: an acquisition phase, a 
modeling phase, a phase of capitalization and operation 
phase. To date and to our knowledge there are no formal 
and systematic approaches to exploit the knowledge re-
lated to accident scenarii. The research is generally lim-
ited particularly in the context of rail transport to the 
phases of capitalization on the operational phase, it is 
generally limited to a purely statistical phase. At the end 
to improve and take advantage of this process of Rex, it is 
essential to develop a knowledge representation formal-
ism most appropriate and most semantic end to prepare 
the ground for the next phase of operations and recom-
mendations to propose and to identify know-how which 
can help stimulate and domain experts in their task of 
certification and accreditation. This paper has presented 
the first results of work on the subject 
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Fig. 9. Acquisition window of accidents 
